


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# REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

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RP AC 77-015C

21 June 1977

110

**Page Denied**



CHINA  
Supplement  
21 June 1977

CONTENTS

Restraint in Korea . . . . . 1

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the East Asia/Pacific Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

RP AC 77-015C



21 June 1977

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### Restraint in Korea

④ Overlapping visits to Korea in early June by Chinese and Soviet delegations provide a comparison of the status of relations between the two rival communist powers and Pyongyang and a contrast in the way Peking and Moscow are treating the issue of US troop withdrawals from South Korea.

① ④ The Chinese delegation was a military one, led by Yang Yung, a central committee member and commander of the Sinkiang Military Region. Yang commanded the "Chinese People's Volunteers" in Korea from 1955 to 1958. He was accompanied by Wu Fu-shan, deputy commander of the Chinese air force. The latter may have been included in the entourage because of the assistance China has given to the North Korean air force.

① Chinese press coverage of the visit was complete, but in a lower key than the more extensive publicity published by the North Korean media. Although Yang repeatedly expressed Chinese support for the reunification of Korea on North Korean terms, he took pains to emphasize the goal of a peaceful reunification. Yang's pledge that China would again fight shoulder to shoulder with the Koreans if necessary was placed in the context of a North Korean defense against an attack from South Korea.

① Yang's hosts also used the theme of peaceful liberation, but not consistently. Omission of the concept in some speeches conveyed a somewhat harsher North Korean stance on reunification, suggesting some North Korean dissatisfaction with China's stand on the issue.

① The leader of the Soviet delegation, Pavel G. Gilashvili, vice president of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, also endorsed peaceful reunification on North Korean terms. In contrast to Yang, however, the Soviet called for prompt and complete withdrawal of US forces from South Korea. Yang did not mention the subject of troop withdrawals.

RP AC 77-015C

21 June 1977

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
① Yang's omission is in the line with Chinese media treatment of this issue, which for over a month has been relatively skimpy and low key. This reluctance to deal with the issue publicly probably stems from several motives. In the interest of maintaining close relations with North Korea, China is forced to welcome publicly the withdrawal of US ground forces from Korea.

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


② Moreover, Peking is probably uncertain about the course withdrawal will take once it is under way and probably wishes to play down the issue until developments become clearer. The Chinese, as Yang's remarks in Pyongyang suggest, appear to be continuing efforts to discourage Kim Il-song from contemplating any actions that might raise tensions in Korea, actions predicted on the basis of an overestimation of the amount of support available from China.

③ The Chinese military delegation received more publicity and a more effusive welcome than the Soviet political group. In addition, the Chinese delegation was received by Kim Il-song, while the Soviets were not--an indication that Pyongyang still "tilts" toward China.



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21 June 1977

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